The 2018 CCES (Cooperative Congressional Election Study, Schaffner et al. 2019) has two items to measure respondent sexism and, in the same grid, two items to measure respondent racism, with responses measured on a five-point scale from strongly agree to strongly disagree:

  • White people in the U.S. have certain advantages because of the color of their skin.
  • Racial problems in the U.S. are rare, isolated situations.
  • When women lose to men in a fair competition, they typically complain about being discriminated against.
  • Feminists are making entirely reasonable demands of men.

The figure below reports the predicted probability of selecting the more liberal policy preference (support or oppose) on the CCES's four environmental policy items, weighted, limited to White respondents, and controlling for respondents' reported sex, age, education, partisan identification, ideological identification, and family income. Blue columns indicate predicted probabilities when controls are set to their means and respondent sexism and racism are set to their minimum values, and black columns indicate predicted probabilities when controls are set to their means and respondent sexism and racism are set to their maximum values.

Rplot01

Below are results replacing the two-item racism measure with the traditional four-item racial resentment measure:

rresent

One possibility is that these strong associations are flukes; but similar patterns appear for the racism items on the 2016 CCES (the 2016 CCES did not have sexism items).

If the strong associations above are not flukes, then I think three possibilities remain: [1] sexism and racism combine to be a powerful *cause* of environmental policy preferences among Whites, [2] this type of associational research design with these items cannot be used to infer causality generally speaking, and [3] this type of associational research design with these items cannot be used to infer causality about environmental policy preferences but could be used to infer causality about other outcome variables, such as approval of the way that Donald Trump is handling his job as president.

If you believe [1], please post in a comment below a theory about how sexism and racism cause substantial changes in these environmental policy preferences. If you believe [3], please post in a comment an explanation why this type of associational research design with these items can be used to make causal inferences for only certain outcome variables and, if possible, a way to determine for which outcome variables a causal inference could be made. If I have omitted a possibility, please also post a comment with that omitted possibility.

NOTES

Stata code.

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According to the 20 Dec 2018 Samuel Perry and Andrew Whitehead Huffington Post article "What 'Make America Great Again' And 'Merry Christmas' Have In Common":

Christian theology, identity or faithfulness have nothing to do with an insistence on saying "Merry Christmas." To be more precise, when we analyzed public polling data, we found that there was no correlation between being an evangelical Christian, believing in the biblical Nativity story, attending church, or participating in charitable giving and rejecting "Season's Greetings" for "Merry Christmas." [emphasis added]

The referenced data are from a December 2013 Public Religion Research Initiative survey. Item Q5 is the "Merry Christmas" item:

Do you think stores and businesses should greet their customers with 'Happy Holidays' or 'Seasons Greetings' instead of 'Merry Christmas' out of respect for people of different faiths, or not? (Q5)

Item Q6 is the biblical Nativity belief item:

Do you believe the story of Christmas -- that is, the Virgin birth, the angelic proclamation to the Shepherds, the Star of Bethlehem, and the Wise Men from the East -- is historically accurate, or is it a theological story to affirm faith in Jesus? (Q6)

Here is the crosstab for the "Merry Christmas" item and the Nativity item:

PRRI-1Contra the article, these variables are correlated: ignoring the don't knows and refusals, 57 percent of participants who believe that the gospel Nativity story is historically accurate preferred the "Merry Christmas" response ("No, should not"), but only 41 percent of participants who believe that the gospel Nativity story is a theological story preferred the "Merry Christmas" response.

Here is a logit regression using the gospel Nativity responses (gospel) to predict the Merry Christmas responses (merry), removing from the analysis the participants who were coded as don't know or refusal for at least one of the items:

PRRI-2The p-value for the logit regression is also p<0.001 in weighted analyses.

The gospel predictor still has a p-value under p=0.05 when including the demographic controls below in unweighted analyses and in weighted analyses:

PRRI-3The gospel predictor still has a p-value under p=0.05 when including the demographic controls and controls for GOP partisanship and self-reported ideology in unweighted analyses:

PRRI-4There are specifications in which the p-value for the gospel predictor is above p=0.05, such as in a weighted analysis including the above controls for demographics, partisanship, and ideology. But the gospel predictor not being robust to every possible specification, especially specifications that control for factors such as GOP partisanship and charitable giving that are plausibly influenced by religious belief, isn't the impression that I received from "...we found that there was no correlation between...believing in the biblical Nativity story...and rejecting 'Season's Greetings' for 'Merry Christmas'".

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Here is another passage from the article:

What does this tell us? Ultimately, drawing lines in the sand over whether people say "Merry Christmas" over "Happy Holidays" has virtually nothing to do with Christian faithfulness or orthodoxy.  It has everything to do with the cultural and political insecurity white conservatives feel.

I didn't see anything in the reported analysis that permits the inference that "It has everything to do with the cultural and political insecurity white conservatives feel". Whites and conservatives being more likely than non-Whites and non-conservatives to prefer "Merry Christmas" doesn't require that this preference is due to "the cultural and political insecurity white conservatives feel" any more than a non-White or non-conservative preference for "Happy Holidays" and "Seasons Greetings" can be attributed without additional information to the cultural and political insecurity that non-White non-conservatives feel.

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NOTES:

1. Code here. Data here. Data acknowledgment: PRRI Religion & Politics Tracking Poll, December 2013; Principal Investigators Robert P. Jones and Daniel Cox; Data were downloaded from the Association of Religion Data Archives, www.TheARDA.com [http://www.thearda.com/Archive/Files/Descriptions/PRRIRP1213.asp].

2. I had a Twitter discussion of the article and the data with co-author Samuel Perry, which can be accessed here.

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The Kearns et al. study "Why Do Some Terrorist Attacks Receive More Media Attention Than Others?" has been published in Justice Quarterly; the abstract indicates that "Controlling for target type, fatalities, and being arrested, attacks by Muslim perpetrators received, on average, 357% more coverage than other attacks". A prior Kearns et al. analysis was reported on in a 2017 Monkey Cage post and a paper posted at SSRN with a "last edited" date of 3/5/17 limited to "media coverage for terrorist attacks in the United States between 2011 and 2015" (p. 7 of the paper).

Data for the Kearns et al. study published in Justice Quarterly has been expanded to cover terrorist attacks from 2006 to 2015 (instead of 2011 to 2015) and now reports a model with a predictor for "Perpetrator and group unknown", with a p-value under 0.05 for the Muslim perpetrator predictor. Footnote 9 of Kearns et al. 2019 discusses selection of 2006 as the starting point:

Starting in 2006, an increasing percentage of Americans used the Internet as their main source of news [URL provided, but omitted in this quote]. Since the news sources used for this study include both print and online newspaper articles, we started our analysis in 2006. In years prior to 2006, we may see fewer articles overall since print was more common and is subject to space constraints (p. 8).

That reason to start the analysis in 2006 does not explain why the analysis in the Monkey Cage post and the 3/5/17 paper started in 2011, given that the news sources in these earlier reports of the study also included both print and online articles.

In this 3/28/17 post, I reported that the Muslim perpetrator predictor had a 0.622 p-value in my analysis predicting the number of articles of media coverage using the Kearns et al. 2011-2015 outcome variable coding, controlling for the number of persons killed in the attack and for whether the perpetrator was unknown.

Using the 2006-2015 dataset and code that Dr. Kearns sent me upon request, I ran my three-predictor model, limiting the analysis to events from 2011 to 2015:

Kearns1The above p-value for the Muslim perpetrator predictor differs from my 0.622 p-value from the prior post, although inferences are the same. There might be multiple reasons for the difference, but the 3/5/17 Kearns et al. paper reports a different number of articles for some events; for example, the Robert Dear event was coded as 204 articles in the paper and as 178 articles in the 2019 article, and the number of articles for the Syed Rizwan Farook / Tashfeen Malik event dropped from 179 to 152.

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The inference about the Muslim perpetrator predictor is more convincing using the 2006-2015 data from Kearns et al. 2019 than from the 2011-2015 data: the 2006-2015 data produce a 2.82 Muslim perpetrator predictor t-score using my three-predictor model above and a 4.20 t-score with a three-predictor model replacing the number killed in the event with a predictor for whether someone was killed in the event.

For what it's worth, along with higher-than-residual news coverage for events with Muslim perpetrators, the Kearns et al. data indicate that, compared to other events with a known perpetrator, events with Muslim perpetrators also have higher-than-residual numbers of deaths, numbers of logged wounded, and (at least at p=0.0766) likelihood of a death:

Kearns2Kearns3Kearns4---

NOTES

1. I could not find the 3/5/17 Kearns et al. paper online now, but I have a PDF copy from SSRN (SSRN-id2928138.pdf) that the above post references.

2. Stata code for my analyses:

gen PerpUnknown=0
replace PerpUnknown=1 if eventid==200601170007
replace PerpUnknown=1 if eventid==200606300004
replace PerpUnknown=1 if eventid==200607120007
replace PerpUnknown=1 if eventid==200705090002
replace PerpUnknown=1 if eventid==200706240004
replace PerpUnknown=1 if eventid==200710200003
replace PerpUnknown=1 if eventid==200710260003
replace PerpUnknown=1 if eventid==200802170007
replace PerpUnknown=1 if eventid==200803020012
replace PerpUnknown=1 if eventid==200803060004
replace PerpUnknown=1 if eventid==200804070005
replace PerpUnknown=1 if eventid==200804220011
replace PerpUnknown=1 if eventid==200806140008
replace PerpUnknown=1 if eventid==200807250030
replace PerpUnknown=1 if eventid==200903070010
replace PerpUnknown=1 if eventid==200909040003
replace PerpUnknown=1 if eventid==201007270013
replace PerpUnknown=1 if eventid==201011160004
replace PerpUnknown=1 if eventid==201101060018
replace PerpUnknown=1 if eventid==201102220009
replace PerpUnknown=1 if eventid==201104230010
replace PerpUnknown=1 if eventid==201105060004
replace PerpUnknown=1 if eventid==201109260012
replace PerpUnknown=1 if eventid==201110120003
replace PerpUnknown=1 if eventid==201205200024
replace PerpUnknown=1 if eventid==201205230034
replace PerpUnknown=1 if eventid==201208120012
replace PerpUnknown=1 if eventid==201301170006
replace PerpUnknown=1 if eventid==201302260036
replace PerpUnknown=1 if eventid==201304160051
replace PerpUnknown=1 if eventid==201304170041
replace PerpUnknown=1 if eventid==201304180010
replace PerpUnknown=1 if eventid==201307250065
replace PerpUnknown=1 if eventid==201308220053
replace PerpUnknown=1 if eventid==201403180089
replace PerpUnknown=1 if eventid==201403250090
replace PerpUnknown=1 if eventid==201406110089
replace PerpUnknown=1 if eventid==201410030065
replace PerpUnknown=1 if eventid==201410240071
replace PerpUnknown=1 if eventid==201411040087
replace PerpUnknown=1 if eventid==201502170127
replace PerpUnknown=1 if eventid==201502230104
replace PerpUnknown=1 if eventid==201503100045
replace PerpUnknown=1 if eventid==201506220069
replace PerpUnknown=1 if eventid==201506230056
replace PerpUnknown=1 if eventid==201506240051
replace PerpUnknown=1 if eventid==201506260046
replace PerpUnknown=1 if eventid==201507150077
replace PerpUnknown=1 if eventid==201507190097
replace PerpUnknown=1 if eventid==201508010105
replace PerpUnknown=1 if eventid==201508020114
replace PerpUnknown=1 if eventid==201508190040
replace PerpUnknown=1 if eventid==201509040048
replace PerpUnknown=1 if eventid==201509300082
replace PerpUnknown=1 if eventid==201512260016
tab PerpUnknown, mi
tab PerpUnknown PerpMuslim, mi
tab PerpUnknown PerpNonMuslim, mi
tab PerpUnknown PerpGroupUnknown, mi
nbreg TOTALARTICLES PerpMuslim numkilled PerpUnknown if eventid>=201101060018
nbreg TOTALARTICLES PerpMuslim numkilled PerpUnknown
gen kill0=0
replace kill0=1 if numkilled==0
tab numkilled kill0
nbreg TOTALARTICLES PerpMuslim kill0     PerpUnknown
ttest numkilled if PerpUnknown==0, by(PerpMuslim)
ttest numkilled                  , by(PerpMuslim)
ttest logwound  if PerpUnknown==0, by(PerpMuslim)
ttest logwound                   , by(PerpMuslim)
prtest kill0    if PerpUnknown==0, by(PerpMuslim)
prtest kill0                     , by(PerpMuslim)

3. Kearns et al. 2019 used a different "unknown" perpetrator measure than I did. My PerpUnknown predictor (in the above analysis and the prior post) coded in a dichotomous variable as 1 any perpetrator listed as "Unknown" in the Kearns et al. list. Kearns et al. 2019 has a dichotomous PerpGroupUnknown variable that differentiated between perpetrators in which the group of the perpetrator was known (such as for this case with an ID of 200807250030 in the Global Terrorism Database, in which the perpetrators were identified as Neo-Nazis) and perpetrators in which the group of the perpetrator was unknown (such as for this case with an ID of 200806140008 in the Global Terrorism Database, in which the perpetrator group was not identified). Kearns et al. 2019 footnote 17 indicates that "Even when the individual perpetrator is unknown, we often know the group responsible so 'perpetrator unknown' is not a theoretically sound category on its own, though we account for these incidents in robustness checks"; however, I'm not sure why "perpetrator unknown" is not a theoretically sound category on its own for the purpose of a control when predicting media coverage: if a perpetrator's name is not known, then there might be fewer news articles because there will be no follow-up articles that delve into the background of the perpetrator in a way that could be done if the perpetrator's name were known.

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According to a 2018-06-18 "survey roundup" blog post by Karthick Ramakrishnan and Janelle Wong (with a link to the blog post tweeted by Jennifer Lee):

Regardless of the question wording, a majority of Asian American respondents express support for affirmative action, including when it is applied specifically to the context of higher education.

However, a majority of Asian American respondents did not express support for affirmative action in data from the National Asian American Survey 2016 Post-Election Survey [data here, dataset citation: Karthick Ramakrishnan, Jennifer Lee, Taeku Lee, and Janelle Wong. National Asian American Survey (NAAS) 2016 Post-Election Survey. Riverside, CA: National Asian American Survey. 2018-03-03.]

Tables below contain item text from the questionnaire. My analysis sample was limited to participants coded 1 for "Asian American" in the dataset's race variable. The three numeric columns in the tables for each item are respectively for: [1] data that are unweighted; [2] data with the nweightnativity weight applied, described in the dataset as "weighted by race/ethnicity and state, nativity, gender, education (raking method"; and [3] data with the pidadjweight weight applied, described in the dataset as "adjusted for partyID variation by ethnicity in re-interview cooperation rate for". See slides 4 and 14 here for more details on the study methodology.

The table below reports on results for items about opinions of particular racial preferences in hiring and promotion. A majority of Asian American respondents did not support these race-based affirmative action policies:

NAAS-Post3

The next table reports on results for items about opinions of particular uses of race in university admissions decisions. A majority of Asian American respondents did not support these race-based affirmative action policies:

NAAS-Post4

I'm not sure why these post-election data were not included in the 2018-06-18 blog post survey roundup or mentioned in this set of slides. I'm also not sure why the manipulations for the university admissions decisions items include only treatments in which the text suggests that Asian American applicants are advantaged by consideration of race instead of or in addition to including treatments in which the text suggests that Asian American applicants are disadvantaged by consideration of race, which would have been perhaps as or more plausible.

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Notes:

1. Code to reproduce my analyses is here. Including Pacific Islanders and restricting the Asian American sample to U.S. citizens did not produce majority support for any affirmative action item reported on above or for the sex-based affirmative action item (Q7.2).

2. The survey had a sex-based affirmative action item (Q7.2) and had items about whether the participant, a close relative of the participant, or a close personal friend of the participant was advantaged or was disadvantaged by affirmative action (Q7.8 to Q7.11). For the Asian American sample, support for preferential hiring and promotion of women in Q7.2 was at 46% unweighted and at 44% when either weighting variable was applied.

3. This NAAS webpage indicates a 2017-12-05 date for the pre-election survey dataset, and on 2017-12-06 the @naasurvey account tweeted a blurb about these data being available for download. However, that same NAAS webpage lists a 2018-03-03 date for the post-election survey dataset, but I did not see an @naasurvey tweet for that release, and that NAAS webpage did not have a link to the post-election data at least as late as 2018-08-16. I tweeted a question about the availability of the post-election data on 2018-08-31 and then sent in an email and later found the data available at the webpage. I think that this might be the NSF grant for the post-election survey, which indicated that the data were to be publicly released through ICPSR in June 2017.

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Below is a discussion of small study effects in the data for the 2017 PNAS article, "Meta-analysis of field experiments shows no change in racial discrimination in hiring over time", by Lincoln Quillian, Devah Pager, Ole Hexel, and Arnfinn Midtbøen. The first part is the initial analysis that I sent to Dr. Quillian. The Quillian et al. team replied here, also available via this link a level up. I responded to this reply below my initial analysis and will notify Dr. Quillian of the reply. Please note that Quillian et al. 2017 mentions publication bias analyses on page 5 of its main text and in Section 5 of the supporting information appendix.

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Initial analysis

Levels of discrimination against Black job applicants in the United States have not changed much or at all over the past 25 years is a conclusion of the Quillian et al. 2017 PNAS article, based on a meta-analysis that focuses on 1989-2015 field experiments assessing discrimination against Black or Hispanic job applicants relative to White applicants. The credibility of this conclusion depends at least on the meta-analysis including the population of relevant field experiments or a representative set of relevant field experiments. However, the graph below for the dataset set of Black/White discrimination field experiments is consistent with what would be expected if the meta-analysis did not have a complete set of studies.

Comment Q2017 Figure 1

The graphs plot a measure of the precision of each study against the corresponding effect size estimate, from the dmap_update_1024recoded_3.dta dataset available here. For a population of studies or for a representative set of studies, the pattern of points is expected to approximate a symmetric pyramid peaking at zero on the y-axis. The logic of this expectation is that, if there were a single true underlying effect, the size of that effect would be the estimated effect size from a perfectly-precise study, which would have a standard error of zero. The average effect size for less-than-perfectly-precise studies should also approximate the true effect size, but any given less-than-perfectly-precise study would not necessarily produce an estimate of the true effect size and would be expected to produce estimates that often fall to one side or the other side of the true effect size, with estimates from lower-precision studies falling further on average from the true effect size than estimates from higher-precision studies, thus creating the expected symmetric pyramid shape.

Egger's test assesses asymmetry in the shape of a pattern of points. The p-value of 0.003 for the Black/White set of studies indicates the presence of sufficient evidence to conclude with reasonable certainty that the pattern of points for the 1989-2015 set of Black/White discrimination field experiments is asymmetric. This particular pattern of asymmetry could have been caused by the higher-precision studies having tested for discrimination in situations with lower levels of anti-Black discrimination relative to situations for the lower-precision studies. But this pattern could also have been produced by suppression of low-precision studies that had null results or had results that indicated discrimination favoring Blacks relative to Whites.

Any inference from analyses of the set of 1989-2015 Black/White discrimination field experiments should thus consider the possibility that the set is incomplete and that any such incompleteness might bias inferences. For example, assessing patterns over time without any adjustment for possible missing studies requires an assumption that the inclusion of any missing studies would not alter the particular inference being made. That might be a reasonable assumption, but it should be identified as an assumption of any such inference.

The graphs below attempt to assess this assumption, by plotting estimates for the 10 earliest 1989-2015 Black/White field experiments and the 10 latest 1989-2015 Black/White field experiments, excluding the study that had no year indicated in the dataset for the year of the fieldwork. Both graphs are at least suggestive of the same type of small study effects.

Comment Q2017 Figure 2

Statistical methods have been developed to estimate the true effect size in meta-analyses after accounting for the possibility that the meta-analysis does not include the population of relevant studies or at least a representative set of relevant studies. For example, the top 10 percent by precision method, the trim-and-fill method with a linear estimator, and the PET-PEESE method cut the estimate of discrimination across the Black/White discrimination field experiments from 36 percent fewer callbacks or interviews to 25 percent, 21 percent, and 20 percent, respectively. These estimates, though, depend heavily on a lack of publication bias in highly-precise studies, which adds another assumption to these analyses and underscores the importance of preregistering studies.

Social science should inform public beliefs and public policy, but the ability of social scientists to not report data that have been collected and analyzed cannot help but undercut this important role for social science. Social scientists should consider preregistering their plans to conduct studies and their planned research designs for analyzing data, to restrict their ability to suppress undesired results and to thus add credibility to their research and to social science in general.

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Reply from the Quillian et al.

Here

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My response to the Quillian et al. reply

[1] The second section heading in the Quillian et al. reply correctly states that "Tests based on funnel plot asymmetry often generate false positives as indicators of publication bias". The Quillian et al. reply reported the funnel plot to the left below and the Egger's test p-value of 0.647 for the set of 13 Black/White discrimination resume audit correspondence field experiments, which provide little-to-no evidence of small study effects or publication bias. However, the funnel plot of the residual set of 8 Black/White discrimination field experiments—of in-person-audits—has an asymmetric shape and a p=0.043 Egger's test indicative of small study effects.

Comment Q2017 Figure 3The Quillian et al. reply indicated that "Using only resume audits to analyze change over time gives no trend (the linear slope is -.002, almost perfectly flat, shown in figure 3 in our original paper, and the weighted-average discrimination ratio is 1.32, only slightly below the ratio of all studies of 1.36)". For me at least, the lack of a temporal pattern in the resume audit (correspondence) field experiments is more convincing after seeing the funnel plot pattern than when not knowing the funnel plot pattern, although now the inference is limited to racial discrimination between 2001 and 2015 because there were no dataset correspondence field experiments conducted between 1989 and 2000. The top graph below illustrates this nearly-flat -0.002 slope for correspondence audit field experiments. Presuming no publication bias or presuming a constant effect of publication bias, it is reasonable to infer that there was no decrease in the level of White-over-Black favoring in correspondence audit field experiments between 2001 and 2015.

Comment Q2017 Figure 4But presuming no publication bias or presuming a constant effect of publication bias, the slope for in-person audits in the bottom graph above indicates a potentially alarming increase in discrimination favoring Whites over Blacks, from the early 1990s to the post-2000 years, with slope of 0.03 and a corresponding p-value of p=0.08. But maybe there's a good reason to not include the three field experiments from 1990 and 1991 with a decade gap between the latest of these three field experiments and the set of post-2000 field experiments. If so, the slope of the line for Black/White discrimination correspondence studies and Black/White discrimination in-person audit studies pooled together from 2001 to 2015 is -0.02 with a p-value of p=0.059, and depicted below.

[2] I don't object to the use of the publication bias test reported on in Quillian et al. 2017. My main objections are to the non-reporting of a funnel plot and to basing the inference that "publication or write-up bias is unlikely to have produced inflated discrimination estimates" (p. 6 of the supporting information index) on a null result from a regression with 21 points and five independent variables. Trim-and-fill lowered the meta-analysis estimate from 0.274 to 0.263 for the 1989-2015 Black/White discrimination correspondence audits, but lowered the 1989-2015 Black/White discrimination in-person audit meta-analysis estimate from 0.421 to 0.158. The trim-and-fill decrease for the pooled set of 1989-2015 Black/White discrimination field experiments is from 0.307 to 0.192.

Funnel plots and corresponding tests of funnel plot asymmetry indicate at most the presence of small study effects, which could be caused by phenomena other than publication bias. The Quillian et al. reply notes that "we find evidence that the difference between in person versus resume audit may create false positives for this test" (p. 4). This information and the reprinted funnel plots below are useful because they suggest multiple reasons to not pool results from in-person audits and correspondence audits for Black/White discrimination, such as [i] the possibility of publication bias in the in-person audit set of studies or [ii] possible differences in mean effect sizes for in-person audits compared to correspondence audits.

Comment Q2017 Figure 3Maybe the best way to report these results is a flat line for correspondence audits indicating no change between 2001 and 2015 (N=13) and a downward-sloping-but-not-statistically-significant line for in-person audits between 2001 and 2015 (N=5), with an upward-sloping-but-not-statistically-significant line for in-person audits between 1989 and 2015 (N=8).

[3] This section discusses the publication bias test used by Quillian et al. 2017. I'll use "available" to describe field experiments retrieved in the search for published and unpublished field experiments.

The Quillian et al. reply (pp. 1-2) describes the logic of the publication bias test that they used as:

If publication bias is a serious issue, then studies that focus on factors other than race/ethnic discrimination should show lower discrimination than studies focused primarily on race/ethnicity, because for the latter studies (but not the former) publication should be difficult for studies that do not find significant evidence of racial discrimination.

The expectation, as I understand it, is that discrimination field experiments with race as the primary focus will have a range of estimates, some of which are statically significant and some of which are not statically significant. If there is publication bias such that race-as-the-primary-focus field experiments that do not find discrimination against Blacks are less likely to be available than race-as-the-primary-focus field experiments that find discrimination against Blacks, then the estimate of discrimination against Blacks in the available race-as-the-primary-focus field experiments should be artificially inflated above the true value of racial discrimination. This publication bias test involves a comparison of this presumed inflated effect size to the effect size from field experiments in which race was not the primary focus, which presumably is closer to the true value of racial discrimination because non-availability in the non-race-as-the-primary-focus field experiments is not primarily due to the p-value and direction for racial discrimination but is instead or primarily due to the p-value and direction for the other type of discrimination. The publication bias test is whether the effect size for the available non-race-focused discrimination field experiments is smaller than effect size for the available race-focused discrimination field experiments.

The effect size for racial discrimination from field experiments in which race was not the primary focus might still be inflated in the presence of publication bias because [non-race-as-the-primary-focus field experiments that don't find discrimination in the primary focus but do find discrimination in the race manipulation] are plausibly more likely to be available than [non-race-as-the-primary-focus field experiments that don't find discrimination in the primary focus or in the race manipulation].

But let's stipulate that the racial discrimination effect size from non-race-as-the-primary-focus field experiments should be smaller than the racial discrimination effect size from race-as-the-primary-focus field experiments. If so, how large must this expected difference be such that the observed null result (0.051 coefficient, 0.112 standard error) in the N=21 five-independent-variable regression in Table S7 of Quillian et al. 2017 should be interpreted as evidence of the absence of nontrivial levels of publication bias?

For what it's worth, the publication bias test in the regression below reflects the test used in Quillian et al. 2017, but with a different model and with removal of the three field experiments from 1990 and 1991, such that the sample is the set of Black/White discrimination field experiments from 2001 to 2015. The control for the study method indicates that in-person audits have an estimated 0.40 larger effect size than correspondence audits. The 95 percent confidence interval for the race_not_focus predictor ranges from -0.21 to 0.18. Is that range inconsistent with the expected value based on this test if there were nontrivial amounts of publication bias?

Comment Q2017 Figure 6---

Data available at the webpage for Quillian et al. 2017 [here]

My R code [here]

My Stata code [here]

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One notable finding in the racial discrimination literature is the boomerang/backlash effect reported in Peffley and Hurwitz 2007:

"...whereas 36% of whites strongly favor the death penalty in the baseline condition, 52% strongly favor it when presented with the argument that the policy is racially unfair" (p. 1001).

The racially-unfair argument shown to participants was: "[Some people say/FBI statistics show] that the death penalty is unfair because most of the people who are executed are African Americans" (p. 1002). Statistics reported in Peffley and Hurwitz 2007 Table 1 indicate that responses differed at p<=0.05 for Whites in the baseline no-argument condition compared to Whites in the argument condition.

However, the boomerang/backlash effect did not appear at p<=0.05 in large-N MTurk direct and conceptual replication attempts reported on in Butler et al. 2017 or in my analysis of a nearly-direct replication attempt using a large-N sample of non-Hispanic Whites in a TESS study by Spencer Piston and Ashley Jardina with data collection by GfK, with a similar null result for a similar racial-bias-argument experiment regarding three strikes laws.

For the weighted TESS data, on a scale from 0 for strongly oppose to 1 for strongly favor, support for the death penalty for persons convicted of murder was 0.015 units lower (p=0.313, n=2018) in the condition in which participants were told "Some people say that the death penalty is unfair because most of the people who are executed are black", compared to the condition in which participants did not receive that statement, with controls for the main experimental conditions for the TESS study, which appeared earlier in the survey. This lack of statistical significance remained when the weighted sample was limited to liberals and extreme liberals; slight liberals, liberals, and extreme liberals; conservatives and extreme conservatives; and slight conservatives, conservatives, and extreme conservatives. There was also no statistically-significant difference between conditions in my analysis of the unweighted data. Regarding missing data, 7 of 1,034 participants in the control condition and 9 of 1,000 participants in the experimental condition did not provide a response.

Moreover, in the prior item on the survey, on a 0-to-1 scale, responses were 0.013 units higher (p=0.403, n=2025) for favoring three strikes laws in the condition in which participants were told that "...critics argue that these laws are unfair because they are especially likely to affect black people", compared to the compared to the condition in which participants did not receive that statement, with controls for the main experimental conditions for the TESS study, which appeared earlier in the survey. This lack of statistical significance remained when the weighted sample was limited to liberals and extreme liberals; slight liberals, liberals, and extreme liberals; conservatives and extreme conservatives; and slight conservatives, conservatives, and extreme conservatives. There was also no statistically-significant difference between conditions in my analysis of the unweighted data. Regarding missing data, 6 of 986 participants in the control condition and 3 of 1,048 participants in the experimental condition did not provide a response.

Null results might be attributable to participants not paying attention, so it is worth noting that the main treatment in the TESS experiment was that participants in one of the three conditions were given a passage to read entitled "Genes May Cause Racial Difference in Heart Disease" and participants in another of the three conditions were given a passage to read entitled "Social Conditions May Cause Racial Difference in Heart Disease". There was a statically-significant difference between these conditions in responses to an item about whether there are biological differences between blacks and whites (p=0.008, n=2,006), with responses in the Genes condition indicating greater estimates of biological differences between blacks and whites.

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NOTE:

Data for the TESS study are available here. My Stata code is available here.

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Continuing from a Twitter thread that currently ended here...

Hi Jenn,

I don't think that it's disingenuous to compare two passages that assess discrimination in decision-making based on models of decision-making that lack measures of relevant non-discriminatory factors that could influence decisions. At that level of abstraction, the two passages are directly comparable.

My perception is that:

The evidence of discrimination against Asian Americans in the cited study about college admissions is stronger than the evidence of discrimination against Asian Americans in the cited study about earnings; therefore, not accepting the evidence of discrimination in the college admissions study as evidence of true discrimination suggests that the evidence of discrimination in the earnings study should also not be accepted as evidence of true discrimination.

I perceive the evidence of discrimination in the college admissions study to be stronger because [1] net of included controls, the college admissions gap appears to be larger than the earnings gap, [2] the college admissions study appears to have fewer and fewer important inferential issues involving samples and included controls [*], and [3] compared to decision-making about which applicants are admitted to a college, decision-making about how much a worker should be paid presumably involves more important information about relevant non-discriminatory factors that have not been included in the statistical control of the studies.

Moreover, including evidence from outside these studies, legal cases involving racial discrimination in college admissions have often involved decision-making that explicitly includes race as a factor. My presumption is that a larger percentage of recent college admissions decisions have been made in which race is an explicit factor in admissions compared to the percentage of recent earnings decisions that have been made in which race is an explicit factor in worker remuneration.

For what it's worth, I think that a residual net racial discrimination is likely across a large number of important decisions made in the absence of perfect information, such as decisions involving college admissions and earnings, and I think that it is reasonable to accept evidence of discrimination against Asian Americans based on the studies cited in both passages.

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[*] Support for [2] above:

[2a] The study that reported an 8% earnings gap was limited to data for men age 25 to 64 with a college degree who were participating in the labor market. Estimates for comparing earnings of White men to earnings of Asian men should be expected to be skewed to the extent that White men and Asian men with the same earnings potential have a different probability of being a college graduate or have a different probability of being in the labor market.

[2b] I don't think that naively controlling for cost of living is correct because higher costs of living partly reflect job perks that should not be completely controlled for. If, after adjusting for cost of living, a person who works in San Francisco has the same equivalent earnings as a person who works in an uncomfortably-humid rural lower-cost-of-living area with few amenities, the person who works in San Francisco is nonetheless better off in terms of climate and access to amenities.

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I'm not sure that selectivity in immigration is relevant. The earnings models control for factors such as highest degree, field of study for the highest degree, and Carnegie classification of the school for the highest degree. It's possible that, net of these controls, Asian American men workers have higher earnings potential than White American men workers, but I'm not aware of evidence for this.

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