Ethnic and Racial Studies recently published "Revisiting the Asian Second-Generation Advantage", by Van C. Tran, Jennifer Lee, and Tiffany J. Huang, which I will refer to below as Tran et al. 2019. Ethnic and Racial Studies has also published my comment, and a Tran et al. response. I'll reply to their response below...

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Here are three findings from Tran et al. 2019 important for the discussion below:

1. Table 2 indicates that U.S. second-generation Chinese, Indians, Filipinos, Vietnamese, and Koreans are more likely than native Whites to hold a college degree.

2. Table 2 indicates that U.S. second-generation Chinese, Indians, Filipinos, Vietnamese, and Koreans are more likely than native Whites to report being in a managerial or professional position.

3. Table 4 Model 1 does not provide evidence at p<.05 that U.S. second-generation Chinese, Indians, Filipinos, Vietnamese, or Koreans are less likely than native Whites to report being in a managerial or professional position, controlling for age, age squared, gender, region, survey year, and educational attainment.

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Below, I'll respond to what I think are the two key errors in the Tran et al. reply.

1.

From the first paragraph of the Tran et al. reply:

Given this Asian educational advantage, we hypothesized that second-generation Asians would also report an occupational advantage over whites, measured by their likelihood to be in a professional or managerial occupation.

It makes sense to expect the second-generation Asian educational advantage to translate to a second-generation Asian occupational advantage. And that is what Tran et al. 2019 Table 2 reported: 45% of native Whites reported being in a professional or managerial position, compared to 73% of second-generation Chinese, 79% of second-generation Indians, 52% of second-generation Filipinos, 53% of second-generation Vietnamese, and 60% of second-generation Koreans. Tran et al. 2019 even commented on this occupational advantage: "Yet despite variation among the second-generation Asian groups, each exhibits higher rates of professional attainment than native-born whites and blacks" (p. 2260). But here is the Tran et al. reply following immediately from the prior block quote:

Contrary to our expectation, however, we found that, with the exception of second-generation Chinese, the other four Asian ethnic groups in our study – Indians, Filipinos, Vietnamese and Koreans – report no such advantage in professional or managerial attainment over whites (Tran, Lee, and Huang 2019: Table 4, Model 1). More precisely, the four Asian ethnic groups are only as likely as whites to be in a managerial or professional occupation, controlling for age, the quadratic term of age, gender, education, and region of the country.

The finding contrary to the Tran et al. expectation (from Tran et al. 2019 Table 4 Model 1) was not from what the other four Asian ethnic groups reported but was from a model predicting what was reported controlling for educational attainment and other factors. Tran et al. therefore expected an educational advantage to cause an occupational advantage that remained after controlling for the educational advantage. The Tran et al. reply states this expressly (p. 2274, emphasis in the original):

Because second-generation Asians hold such a significant educational advantage over whites, we had expected that second-generation Asians would also report an occupational advantage over whites, even after controlling for respondents' education.

Properly controlling for a factor means to eliminate the factor as an explanation. For instance, men having a higher average annual salary than women have might be due to men working more hours on average per year than women work. Comparing the average hourly salary for men to the average hourly salary for women controls for hours worked and eliminates the explanation that the any residual gender difference in average annual salary is due to a gender difference in hours worked per year. The logic of the Tran et al. expectation applied to the gender salary gap would produce expectations such as: Because men work more hours on average than women work, we expected that men would have a higher average annual salary than women have, even after controlling for the fact that men work more hours on average than women work.

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2.

From the Tran et al. reply (p. 2274, emphasis added):

Given that second-generation Asians are more likely to have graduated from college than whites, we hypothesized that they would evince a greater likelihood of attaining a professional or managerial position than whites, as is the case for the Chinese. Instead, we found that second-generation Chinese are the exception, rather than the norm, among second-generation Asians. Hence, we concluded that second-generation Asians are over-credentialed in education in order to achieve parity with whites in the labor market.

I think that there are two ways that labor market parity can be properly conceptualized in the context of this analysis. The first is for labor market outcomes for second-generation Asians to equal labor market outcomes for native Whites, without controlling for any factors; the second is for labor market outcomes for second-generation Asians to equal to labor market outcomes for native Whites, controlling for particular factors. Tran et al. appear to be using the "controlling for" conceptualization of parity. Now to the bolded statement...

Ignoring the advantage for second-generation Chinese, and interpreting as parity insufficient evidence of a difference in the presence of statistical control, Tran et al. 2019 provided evidence that second-generation Asians are over-credentialed in education relative to native Whites *and* that second-generation Asians have achieved labor market parity with native Whites. But I do not see anything in the Tran et al. 2019 analysis or reply that indicates that second-generation Asians need to be over-credentialed in education "in order to achieve" this labor market parity with native Whites.

Returning to the gender salary gap example, imagine that men have a higher average annual salary than women have, but that this salary advantage disappears when controlling for hours worked, so that men have salary parity with women; nothing in that analysis indicates that men need to overwork in order to achieve salary parity with women.

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So I think that the two key errors in the Tran et al. reply are:

1. The expectation that the effect of education will remain after controlling for education.

2. The inference from their reported results that second-generation Asians need to be over-credentialed in order to achieve labor market parity with natives Whites.

Racial resentment and symbolic racism are terms used to describe a set of measures used in racial attitudes research, including statements such as "Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors". This item and at least some of the other racial resentment items confound racism and nonracial ideology; in this "special favors" item, an individualist who believes that everyone should work their way up without special favors would select a response on the same side of the scale as an antiBlack racist who believes that only Blacks should work their way up without special favors.

Feldman and Huddy (2005) concluded that "racial resentment is an inadequate measure of prejudice because it confounds prejudice and political ideology" (p. 181), which is consistent with factor analysis of racial resentment items (Sears and Henry 2003: 271). Some research has addressed this confounding with what Feldman and Huddy (2005: 171) call the multivariate approach, in which the analysis includes statistical control for related ideological values. The logic of this multivariate approach is that racial resentment confounds ideology and antiBlack animus so that controlling for ideology should permit the residual association of racial resentment to be interpreted as the association due to antiBlack animus.

The analysis below approaches from the opposite direction: racial resentment confounds ideology and antiBlack animus so that controlling for antiBlack animus should permit the residual association of racial resentment to be interpreted as the association due to ideology. Moreover, if controls for ideology and for antiBlack animus are both included, then the association of racial resentment with an outcome variable should be zero. But this is not even close to being true, as illustrated below in a figure that reports the association of racial resentment with racial or possibly racialized outcome variables, using different sets of statistical control.

In each panel above, the top estimate indicates the association of racial resentment with the outcome variable controlling for only demographics. The second and third estimates respectively indicate the association of racial resentment with outcome variables after controls for demographics and racial attitudes and after controls for demographics and ideology. The fourth and fifth estimates respectively indicate the association of racial resentment with outcome variables after controls for demographics, ideology, and racial attitudes and after controls for demographics, ideology, and racial animus. The key comparison is between the third estimate and the fourth and fifth estimates: the measures of racial attitudes and racial animus had relatively little impact on the racial resentment estimate once the controls for ideology were included in the analysis. For example, in the top left panel, the coefficient for racial resentment was 0.51 controlling for demographics and ideology, was 0.48 controlling for demographics, ideology, and racial attitudes, and was 0.52 controlling for demographics, ideology, and racial animus. In a common racial resentment association analysis, the 0.51 coefficient controlling for demographics and ideology would be assigned to antiBlack animus, but the addition of seven racial attitudes controls accounted for only 0.03 of the 0.51 coefficient and the inclusion of six antiBlack animus controls did not even reduce the 0.51 coefficient. (see the Notes below for more description on the measurements).

A reasonable critique of the above analysis is that racial resentment taps a form of antiBlack racism that is not captured or is not well captured in the included measures of racial attitudes and racial animus. But, from what I can tell, that is an equally valid criticism of analyses that control for ideology: the nonracial ideology captured in racial resentment measures is not captured or not well captured in the included measures of ideology.

NOTES

1. The sample for the analysis was the 3,261 non-Hispanic Whites who completed face-to-face or online the pre- and post-election surveys, conducted between 8 September 2012 and 24 January 2013, and who were not listwise deleted from a model due to missing data for a variable. Each variable in the analysis was coded to range from 0 to 1. Linear regressions without weights were used to predict values of the outcome variables.

The racial resentment measure summed responses to the four ANES 2012 racial resentment items. Models included demographic controls for participant sex, marital status, age, education level, and household family income. Ideological controls were self-reported partisanship, self-reported ideology, an item about guaranteed jobs, an index of attitudes about the role of government, a moral traditionalism index, an authoritarianism index, and an egalitarianism index.

One set of models included seven controls for racial attitudes: a feeling thermometer difference of ratings of Whites and ratings of Blacks, a rating difference for Blacks and for Whites in general on a laziness stereotype scale, a rating difference for Whites and for Blacks in general on an intelligence stereotype scale, an item rating admiration of Blacks, an item rating sympathy for Blacks, an item measuring the perceived political influence of Blacks relative to Whites, and a difference in ratings of the level of discrimination in the United States today against Whites and against Blacks. Another set of models included six dichotomous controls that attempted to isolate antiBlack animus: a more than 20-point feeling thermometer rating difference in which Whites were rated higher than Blacks and with Whites rated at or above 50 and Blacks rated below 50, a rating of Blacks as lazier in general than Whites, a rating of Whites as more intelligent in general than Blacks, an indication of never feeling sympathy for Blacks, an indication that Blacks have too much influence in American politics but Whites don't, and an indication that there is no discrimination against Blacks in the United States today but that there is discrimination against Whites in the United States today.

2. Code for the analysis is here.

3. Results for the 2016 ANES are below:

4. Code for the 2016 ANES analysis is here.

5. Citations:

American National Election Studies (ANES). 2016. ANES 2012 Time Series Study. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2016-05-17. https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR35157.v1.

American National Election Studies, University of Michigan, and Stanford University. 2017. ANES 2016 Time Series Study. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2017-09-19. https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR36824.v2.

The 2018 CCES (Cooperative Congressional Election Study, Schaffner et al. 2019) has two items to measure respondent sexism and, in the same grid, two items to measure respondent racism, with responses measured on a five-point scale from strongly agree to strongly disagree:

  • White people in the U.S. have certain advantages because of the color of their skin.
  • Racial problems in the U.S. are rare, isolated situations.
  • When women lose to men in a fair competition, they typically complain about being discriminated against.
  • Feminists are making entirely reasonable demands of men.

The figure below reports the predicted probability of selecting the more liberal policy preference (support or oppose) on the CCES's four environmental policy items, weighted, limited to White respondents, and controlling for respondents' reported sex, age, education, partisan identification, ideological identification, and family income. Blue columns indicate predicted probabilities when controls are set to their means and respondent sexism and racism are set to their minimum values, and black columns indicate predicted probabilities when controls are set to their means and respondent sexism and racism are set to their maximum values.

Rplot01

Below are results replacing the two-item racism measure with the traditional four-item racial resentment measure:

rresent

One possibility is that these strong associations are flukes; but similar patterns appear for the racism items on the 2016 CCES (the 2016 CCES did not have sexism items).

If the strong associations above are not flukes, then I think three possibilities remain: [1] sexism and racism combine to be a powerful *cause* of environmental policy preferences among Whites, [2] this type of associational research design with these items cannot be used to infer causality generally speaking, and [3] this type of associational research design with these items cannot be used to infer causality about environmental policy preferences but could be used to infer causality about other outcome variables, such as approval of the way that Donald Trump is handling his job as president.

If you believe [1], please post in a comment below a theory about how sexism and racism cause substantial changes in these environmental policy preferences. If you believe [3], please post in a comment an explanation why this type of associational research design with these items can be used to make causal inferences for only certain outcome variables and, if possible, a way to determine for which outcome variables a causal inference could be made. If I have omitted a possibility, please also post a comment with that omitted possibility.

NOTES

Stata code.

According to a 2018-06-18 "survey roundup" blog post by Karthick Ramakrishnan and Janelle Wong (with a link to the blog post tweeted by Jennifer Lee):

Regardless of the question wording, a majority of Asian American respondents express support for affirmative action, including when it is applied specifically to the context of higher education.

However, a majority of Asian American respondents did not express support for affirmative action in data from the National Asian American Survey 2016 Post-Election Survey [data here, dataset citation: Karthick Ramakrishnan, Jennifer Lee, Taeku Lee, and Janelle Wong. National Asian American Survey (NAAS) 2016 Post-Election Survey. Riverside, CA: National Asian American Survey. 2018-03-03.]

Tables below contain item text from the questionnaire. My analysis sample was limited to participants coded 1 for "Asian American" in the dataset's race variable. The three numeric columns in the tables for each item are respectively for: [1] data that are unweighted; [2] data with the nweightnativity weight applied, described in the dataset as "weighted by race/ethnicity and state, nativity, gender, education (raking method"; and [3] data with the pidadjweight weight applied, described in the dataset as "adjusted for partyID variation by ethnicity in re-interview cooperation rate for". See slides 4 and 14 here for more details on the study methodology.

The table below reports on results for items about opinions of particular racial preferences in hiring and promotion. A majority of Asian American respondents did not support these race-based affirmative action policies:

NAAS-Post3

The next table reports on results for items about opinions of particular uses of race in university admissions decisions. A majority of Asian American respondents did not support these race-based affirmative action policies:

NAAS-Post4

I'm not sure why these post-election data were not included in the 2018-06-18 blog post survey roundup or mentioned in this set of slides. I'm also not sure why the manipulations for the university admissions decisions items include only treatments in which the text suggests that Asian American applicants are advantaged by consideration of race instead of or in addition to including treatments in which the text suggests that Asian American applicants are disadvantaged by consideration of race, which would have been perhaps as or more plausible.

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Notes:

1. Code to reproduce my analyses is here. Including Pacific Islanders and restricting the Asian American sample to U.S. citizens did not produce majority support for any affirmative action item reported on above or for the sex-based affirmative action item (Q7.2).

2. The survey had a sex-based affirmative action item (Q7.2) and had items about whether the participant, a close relative of the participant, or a close personal friend of the participant was advantaged or was disadvantaged by affirmative action (Q7.8 to Q7.11). For the Asian American sample, support for preferential hiring and promotion of women in Q7.2 was at 46% unweighted and at 44% when either weighting variable was applied.

3. This NAAS webpage indicates a 2017-12-05 date for the pre-election survey dataset, and on 2017-12-06 the @naasurvey account tweeted a blurb about these data being available for download. However, that same NAAS webpage lists a 2018-03-03 date for the post-election survey dataset, but I did not see an @naasurvey tweet for that release, and that NAAS webpage did not have a link to the post-election data at least as late as 2018-08-16. I tweeted a question about the availability of the post-election data on 2018-08-31 and then sent in an email and later found the data available at the webpage. I think that this might be the NSF grant for the post-election survey, which indicated that the data were to be publicly released through ICPSR in June 2017.

Below is a discussion of small study effects in the data for the 2017 PNAS article, "Meta-analysis of field experiments shows no change in racial discrimination in hiring over time", by Lincoln Quillian, Devah Pager, Ole Hexel, and Arnfinn Midtbøen. The first part is the initial analysis that I sent to Dr. Quillian. The Quillian et al. team replied here, also available via this link a level up. I responded to this reply below my initial analysis and will notify Dr. Quillian of the reply. Please note that Quillian et al. 2017 mentions publication bias analyses on page 5 of its main text and in Section 5 of the supporting information appendix.

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Initial analysis

Levels of discrimination against Black job applicants in the United States have not changed much or at all over the past 25 years is a conclusion of the Quillian et al. 2017 PNAS article, based on a meta-analysis that focuses on 1989-2015 field experiments assessing discrimination against Black or Hispanic job applicants relative to White applicants. The credibility of this conclusion depends at least on the meta-analysis including the population of relevant field experiments or a representative set of relevant field experiments. However, the graph below for the dataset set of Black/White discrimination field experiments is consistent with what would be expected if the meta-analysis did not have a complete set of studies.

Comment Q2017 Figure 1

The graphs plot a measure of the precision of each study against the corresponding effect size estimate, from the dmap_update_1024recoded_3.dta dataset available here. For a population of studies or for a representative set of studies, the pattern of points is expected to approximate a symmetric pyramid peaking at zero on the y-axis. The logic of this expectation is that, if there were a single true underlying effect, the size of that effect would be the estimated effect size from a perfectly-precise study, which would have a standard error of zero. The average effect size for less-than-perfectly-precise studies should also approximate the true effect size, but any given less-than-perfectly-precise study would not necessarily produce an estimate of the true effect size and would be expected to produce estimates that often fall to one side or the other side of the true effect size, with estimates from lower-precision studies falling further on average from the true effect size than estimates from higher-precision studies, thus creating the expected symmetric pyramid shape.

Egger's test assesses asymmetry in the shape of a pattern of points. The p-value of 0.003 for the Black/White set of studies indicates the presence of sufficient evidence to conclude with reasonable certainty that the pattern of points for the 1989-2015 set of Black/White discrimination field experiments is asymmetric. This particular pattern of asymmetry could have been caused by the higher-precision studies having tested for discrimination in situations with lower levels of anti-Black discrimination relative to situations for the lower-precision studies. But this pattern could also have been produced by suppression of low-precision studies that had null results or had results that indicated discrimination favoring Blacks relative to Whites.

Any inference from analyses of the set of 1989-2015 Black/White discrimination field experiments should thus consider the possibility that the set is incomplete and that any such incompleteness might bias inferences. For example, assessing patterns over time without any adjustment for possible missing studies requires an assumption that the inclusion of any missing studies would not alter the particular inference being made. That might be a reasonable assumption, but it should be identified as an assumption of any such inference.

The graphs below attempt to assess this assumption, by plotting estimates for the 10 earliest 1989-2015 Black/White field experiments and the 10 latest 1989-2015 Black/White field experiments, excluding the study that had no year indicated in the dataset for the year of the fieldwork. Both graphs are at least suggestive of the same type of small study effects.

Comment Q2017 Figure 2

Statistical methods have been developed to estimate the true effect size in meta-analyses after accounting for the possibility that the meta-analysis does not include the population of relevant studies or at least a representative set of relevant studies. For example, the top 10 percent by precision method, the trim-and-fill method with a linear estimator, and the PET-PEESE method cut the estimate of discrimination across the Black/White discrimination field experiments from 36 percent fewer callbacks or interviews to 25 percent, 21 percent, and 20 percent, respectively. These estimates, though, depend heavily on a lack of publication bias in highly-precise studies, which adds another assumption to these analyses and underscores the importance of preregistering studies.

Social science should inform public beliefs and public policy, but the ability of social scientists to not report data that have been collected and analyzed cannot help but undercut this important role for social science. Social scientists should consider preregistering their plans to conduct studies and their planned research designs for analyzing data, to restrict their ability to suppress undesired results and to thus add credibility to their research and to social science in general.

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Reply from the Quillian et al.

Here

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My response to the Quillian et al. reply

[1] The second section heading in the Quillian et al. reply correctly states that "Tests based on funnel plot asymmetry often generate false positives as indicators of publication bias". The Quillian et al. reply reported the funnel plot to the left below and the Egger's test p-value of 0.647 for the set of 13 Black/White discrimination resume audit correspondence field experiments, which provide little-to-no evidence of small study effects or publication bias. However, the funnel plot of the residual set of 8 Black/White discrimination field experiments—of in-person-audits—has an asymmetric shape and a p=0.043 Egger's test indicative of small study effects.

Comment Q2017 Figure 3The Quillian et al. reply indicated that "Using only resume audits to analyze change over time gives no trend (the linear slope is -.002, almost perfectly flat, shown in figure 3 in our original paper, and the weighted-average discrimination ratio is 1.32, only slightly below the ratio of all studies of 1.36)". For me at least, the lack of a temporal pattern in the resume audit (correspondence) field experiments is more convincing after seeing the funnel plot pattern than when not knowing the funnel plot pattern, although now the inference is limited to racial discrimination between 2001 and 2015 because there were no dataset correspondence field experiments conducted between 1989 and 2000. The top graph below illustrates this nearly-flat -0.002 slope for correspondence audit field experiments. Presuming no publication bias or presuming a constant effect of publication bias, it is reasonable to infer that there was no decrease in the level of White-over-Black favoring in correspondence audit field experiments between 2001 and 2015.

Comment Q2017 Figure 4But presuming no publication bias or presuming a constant effect of publication bias, the slope for in-person audits in the bottom graph above indicates a potentially alarming increase in discrimination favoring Whites over Blacks, from the early 1990s to the post-2000 years, with slope of 0.03 and a corresponding p-value of p=0.08. But maybe there's a good reason to not include the three field experiments from 1990 and 1991 with a decade gap between the latest of these three field experiments and the set of post-2000 field experiments. If so, the slope of the line for Black/White discrimination correspondence studies and Black/White discrimination in-person audit studies pooled together from 2001 to 2015 is -0.02 with a p-value of p=0.059, and depicted below.

[2] I don't object to the use of the publication bias test reported on in Quillian et al. 2017. My main objections are to the non-reporting of a funnel plot and to basing the inference that "publication or write-up bias is unlikely to have produced inflated discrimination estimates" (p. 6 of the supporting information index) on a null result from a regression with 21 points and five independent variables. Trim-and-fill lowered the meta-analysis estimate from 0.274 to 0.263 for the 1989-2015 Black/White discrimination correspondence audits, but lowered the 1989-2015 Black/White discrimination in-person audit meta-analysis estimate from 0.421 to 0.158. The trim-and-fill decrease for the pooled set of 1989-2015 Black/White discrimination field experiments is from 0.307 to 0.192.

Funnel plots and corresponding tests of funnel plot asymmetry indicate at most the presence of small study effects, which could be caused by phenomena other than publication bias. The Quillian et al. reply notes that "we find evidence that the difference between in person versus resume audit may create false positives for this test" (p. 4). This information and the reprinted funnel plots below are useful because they suggest multiple reasons to not pool results from in-person audits and correspondence audits for Black/White discrimination, such as [i] the possibility of publication bias in the in-person audit set of studies or [ii] possible differences in mean effect sizes for in-person audits compared to correspondence audits.

Comment Q2017 Figure 3Maybe the best way to report these results is a flat line for correspondence audits indicating no change between 2001 and 2015 (N=13) and a downward-sloping-but-not-statistically-significant line for in-person audits between 2001 and 2015 (N=5), with an upward-sloping-but-not-statistically-significant line for in-person audits between 1989 and 2015 (N=8).

[3] This section discusses the publication bias test used by Quillian et al. 2017. I'll use "available" to describe field experiments retrieved in the search for published and unpublished field experiments.

The Quillian et al. reply (pp. 1-2) describes the logic of the publication bias test that they used as:

If publication bias is a serious issue, then studies that focus on factors other than race/ethnic discrimination should show lower discrimination than studies focused primarily on race/ethnicity, because for the latter studies (but not the former) publication should be difficult for studies that do not find significant evidence of racial discrimination.

The expectation, as I understand it, is that discrimination field experiments with race as the primary focus will have a range of estimates, some of which are statically significant and some of which are not statically significant. If there is publication bias such that race-as-the-primary-focus field experiments that do not find discrimination against Blacks are less likely to be available than race-as-the-primary-focus field experiments that find discrimination against Blacks, then the estimate of discrimination against Blacks in the available race-as-the-primary-focus field experiments should be artificially inflated above the true value of racial discrimination. This publication bias test involves a comparison of this presumed inflated effect size to the effect size from field experiments in which race was not the primary focus, which presumably is closer to the true value of racial discrimination because non-availability in the non-race-as-the-primary-focus field experiments is not primarily due to the p-value and direction for racial discrimination but is instead or primarily due to the p-value and direction for the other type of discrimination. The publication bias test is whether the effect size for the available non-race-focused discrimination field experiments is smaller than effect size for the available race-focused discrimination field experiments.

The effect size for racial discrimination from field experiments in which race was not the primary focus might still be inflated in the presence of publication bias because [non-race-as-the-primary-focus field experiments that don't find discrimination in the primary focus but do find discrimination in the race manipulation] are plausibly more likely to be available than [non-race-as-the-primary-focus field experiments that don't find discrimination in the primary focus or in the race manipulation].

But let's stipulate that the racial discrimination effect size from non-race-as-the-primary-focus field experiments should be smaller than the racial discrimination effect size from race-as-the-primary-focus field experiments. If so, how large must this expected difference be such that the observed null result (0.051 coefficient, 0.112 standard error) in the N=21 five-independent-variable regression in Table S7 of Quillian et al. 2017 should be interpreted as evidence of the absence of nontrivial levels of publication bias?

For what it's worth, the publication bias test in the regression below reflects the test used in Quillian et al. 2017, but with a different model and with removal of the three field experiments from 1990 and 1991, such that the sample is the set of Black/White discrimination field experiments from 2001 to 2015. The control for the study method indicates that in-person audits have an estimated 0.40 larger effect size than correspondence audits. The 95 percent confidence interval for the race_not_focus predictor ranges from -0.21 to 0.18. Is that range inconsistent with the expected value based on this test if there were nontrivial amounts of publication bias?

Comment Q2017 Figure 6---

Data available at the webpage for Quillian et al. 2017 [here]

My R code [here]

My Stata code [here]

One notable finding in the racial discrimination literature is the boomerang/backlash effect reported in Peffley and Hurwitz 2007:

"...whereas 36% of whites strongly favor the death penalty in the baseline condition, 52% strongly favor it when presented with the argument that the policy is racially unfair" (p. 1001).

The racially-unfair argument shown to participants was: "[Some people say/FBI statistics show] that the death penalty is unfair because most of the people who are executed are African Americans" (p. 1002). Statistics reported in Peffley and Hurwitz 2007 Table 1 indicate that responses differed at p<=0.05 for Whites in the baseline no-argument condition compared to Whites in the argument condition.

However, the boomerang/backlash effect did not appear at p<=0.05 in large-N MTurk direct and conceptual replication attempts reported on in Butler et al. 2017 or in my analysis of a nearly-direct replication attempt using a large-N sample of non-Hispanic Whites in a TESS study by Spencer Piston and Ashley Jardina with data collection by GfK, with a similar null result for a similar racial-bias-argument experiment regarding three strikes laws.

For the weighted TESS data, on a scale from 0 for strongly oppose to 1 for strongly favor, support for the death penalty for persons convicted of murder was 0.015 units lower (p=0.313, n=2018) in the condition in which participants were told "Some people say that the death penalty is unfair because most of the people who are executed are black", compared to the condition in which participants did not receive that statement, with controls for the main experimental conditions for the TESS study, which appeared earlier in the survey. This lack of statistical significance remained when the weighted sample was limited to liberals and extreme liberals; slight liberals, liberals, and extreme liberals; conservatives and extreme conservatives; and slight conservatives, conservatives, and extreme conservatives. There was also no statistically-significant difference between conditions in my analysis of the unweighted data. Regarding missing data, 7 of 1,034 participants in the control condition and 9 of 1,000 participants in the experimental condition did not provide a response.

Moreover, in the prior item on the survey, on a 0-to-1 scale, responses were 0.013 units higher (p=0.403, n=2025) for favoring three strikes laws in the condition in which participants were told that "...critics argue that these laws are unfair because they are especially likely to affect black people", compared to the compared to the condition in which participants did not receive that statement, with controls for the main experimental conditions for the TESS study, which appeared earlier in the survey. This lack of statistical significance remained when the weighted sample was limited to liberals and extreme liberals; slight liberals, liberals, and extreme liberals; conservatives and extreme conservatives; and slight conservatives, conservatives, and extreme conservatives. There was also no statistically-significant difference between conditions in my analysis of the unweighted data. Regarding missing data, 6 of 986 participants in the control condition and 3 of 1,048 participants in the experimental condition did not provide a response.

Null results might be attributable to participants not paying attention, so it is worth noting that the main treatment in the TESS experiment was that participants in one of the three conditions were given a passage to read entitled "Genes May Cause Racial Difference in Heart Disease" and participants in another of the three conditions were given a passage to read entitled "Social Conditions May Cause Racial Difference in Heart Disease". There was a statically-significant difference between these conditions in responses to an item about whether there are biological differences between blacks and whites (p=0.008, n=2,006), with responses in the Genes condition indicating greater estimates of biological differences between blacks and whites.

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NOTE:

Data for the TESS study are available here. My Stata code is available here.

Continuing from a Twitter thread that currently ended here...

Hi Jenn,

I don't think that it's disingenuous to compare two passages that assess discrimination in decision-making based on models of decision-making that lack measures of relevant non-discriminatory factors that could influence decisions. At that level of abstraction, the two passages are directly comparable.

My perception is that:

The evidence of discrimination against Asian Americans in the cited study about college admissions is stronger than the evidence of discrimination against Asian Americans in the cited study about earnings; therefore, not accepting the evidence of discrimination in the college admissions study as evidence of true discrimination suggests that the evidence of discrimination in the earnings study should also not be accepted as evidence of true discrimination.

I perceive the evidence of discrimination in the college admissions study to be stronger because [1] net of included controls, the college admissions gap appears to be larger than the earnings gap, [2] the college admissions study appears to have fewer and fewer important inferential issues involving samples and included controls [*], and [3] compared to decision-making about which applicants are admitted to a college, decision-making about how much a worker should be paid presumably involves more important information about relevant non-discriminatory factors that have not been included in the statistical control of the studies.

Moreover, including evidence from outside these studies, legal cases involving racial discrimination in college admissions have often involved decision-making that explicitly includes race as a factor. My presumption is that a larger percentage of recent college admissions decisions have been made in which race is an explicit factor in admissions compared to the percentage of recent earnings decisions that have been made in which race is an explicit factor in worker remuneration.

For what it's worth, I think that a residual net racial discrimination is likely across a large number of important decisions made in the absence of perfect information, such as decisions involving college admissions and earnings, and I think that it is reasonable to accept evidence of discrimination against Asian Americans based on the studies cited in both passages.

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[*] Support for [2] above:

[2a] The study that reported an 8% earnings gap was limited to data for men age 25 to 64 with a college degree who were participating in the labor market. Estimates for comparing earnings of White men to earnings of Asian men should be expected to be skewed to the extent that White men and Asian men with the same earnings potential have a different probability of being a college graduate or have a different probability of being in the labor market.

[2b] I don't think that naively controlling for cost of living is correct because higher costs of living partly reflect job perks that should not be completely controlled for. If, after adjusting for cost of living, a person who works in San Francisco has the same equivalent earnings as a person who works in an uncomfortably-humid rural lower-cost-of-living area with few amenities, the person who works in San Francisco is nonetheless better off in terms of climate and access to amenities.

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I'm not sure that selectivity in immigration is relevant. The earnings models control for factors such as highest degree, field of study for the highest degree, and Carnegie classification of the school for the highest degree. It's possible that, net of these controls, Asian American men workers have higher earnings potential than White American men workers, but I'm not aware of evidence for this.